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
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
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South Vietnam: Enemy-initiated military action remained light throughout the country on 13-14 April.

Communist mortar and rocket attacks dropped off from the levels of the previous three nights, as 15-odd targets, mostly military bases, were hit. Casualties and damage were generally light. Enemy ground forces conducted only one strong assault, against a South Vietnamese Army compound just south of Saigon in Long An Province.

Other significant clashes were forced by US units on sweep operations northwest of Saigon and in the Mekong Delta area.



Czechoslovakia: Apprehension is spreading within the party and among the population over what may occur at the crucial central committee plenum that opens on 17 April.

According to unconfirmed press reports, Dubcek and possibly other Czechoslovak leaders will fly to Moscow to discuss the agenda of the plenum. There are rumors that the central committee will agree to abolish the executive committee of the presidium—the "inner presidium" created last November—and scale down the body from 21 to about 13 members. This may, in fact, be the leadership's response to Soviet demand for the removal of several prominent progressives.

Party conservatives, who do not hold a majority in the central committee, will probably attempt to use the tensions—which they and the Soviets are helping to generate—to start a general movement toward retrenchment and a return to "realism." In the face of these tactics, the liberals are becoming disheartened. One important progressive doubts that Dubcek is tactically aware enough to withstand a concerted challenge by the pro-Soviet conservatives.

The Dubcek leadership has come under unprecedented attack by Hungarian party chief Kadar, who for reasons of his own has criticized its vacillation. A full text of Kadar's speech is as yet unavailable, but Moscow's <u>Pravda</u> has approvingly quoted Kadar's criticism, adding to unease in Prague.

On 12 April the principal Czechoslovak party paper, Rude Pravo, indulged in self-criticism by admitting its failure to launch a campaign against dissident mass media; in so doing it indirectly

criticized the party leadership for lack of direction. This self-censure reflects the paper's "new look" with a conservative editorial staff.

Students at Prague's Charles University yesterday staged a one-day "teach in" during which they reportedly listened to speeches by liberal trade union officials and journalists. According to one press account, several progressive members of the central committee also attended, which could add another argument in support of conservative charges that party liberals are organizing such dissidence. There is still no information to confirm rumors and press reports that the Soviets have moved or are preparing to move additional troops into Czechoslovakia.

Japan: (Japanese leftists are planning a series of potentially violent actions during the next two weeks. Ultraradical students are emphasizing the return of Okinawa as a theme in their continuing efforts to create opposition to renewal of the US-Japan security treaty in 1970. They are billing their activities as a rehearsal for a major effort to block Prime Minister Sato's visit to the US next fall. The campaign is to begin on 17 April with a dockside demonstration to greet a delegation of radical students arriving in Tokyo from Okinawa. Other activities tentatively scheduled include "raids" on the US Embassy, the Diet Building, the prime minister's residence, and the Defense Agency the students may complex. adopt new weapons and tactics, such as hit-and-run guerrilla actions aimed at overtaxing police strength. |the students may crash a 30,000- to 40,000-strong peaceful rally of Socialists, Communists, and union members on the annual Okinawa Reversion Day, 28 April, and try to provoke a major confrontation between demonstrators and police.)

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India - East Germany: India's upgrading of its trade office in East Berlin to the status of an official trade representation may be a step toward eventual recognition of East Germany.

New Delhi has been under increasing pressure both domestically and from the Soviets and East Germans; to regularize relations with the German Democratic Republic. A Communist-sponsored resolution in the Indian parliament last month calling for full diplomatic recognition of the GDR might well have passed if there had been time for a vote. During the debate a substantial number of Congress Party members spoke in favor of the resolution.

Indian officials insist that their present trade office in East Berlin cannot adequately cope with growing East German purchases of Indian exports. Furthermore, in the absence of official status for the trade office, the GDR has refused to permit pouch service between East Berlin and Indian embassies in Prague and Moscow.

Bonn, nonetheless would continue to regard full recognition of
the Pankow government as an unfriendly act and is
probably relieved that New Delhi is willing to settle for something less. For their part, the Indians
are anxious not to further antagonize the Bonn
government--India's second largest Western aid
donor--and probably calculate that additional moves
in the direction of recognition can now be staved
off for several years.

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NOTE

ENDC: The "nonaligned eight" at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) now seem willing to give priority to seabeds arms control negotiations. During the early weeks of the session, which began on 18 March, these nonnuclear countries had favored a comprehensive test ban as the item most urgently requiring attention, and were suspicious of US and Soviet emphasis on seabeds. With real progress unlikely soon on such a ban or on a cutoff of production of fissionable material for weapons usage, seabeds control offers the best prospect for positive results before the start of the 24th General Assembly.

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